All work intensity is not created equal: Effort motives,job satisfaction and quit intentions at a grocery chain

Prior research has shown that the well-being of employees engaged in intensive work can vary with the discretion their jobs afford regarding how and when to carry out the work. This article explores a different avenue. It argues that well-being also varies with employees’ individual motives for working intensively. The article introduces self-determination theory to the domain of work intensity and focuses on two hypotheses. The first is whether intensive work driven by explicit or implicit incentives is more positively associated with an employee's job satisfaction than intensive work driven by job demands. The second is whether intensive work driven by intrinsic motives is more positively associated with job satisfaction than that driven by explicit or implicit incentives. In both these cases, the article also examines whether equivalent effects exist on (reduced) quit intentions. Original data from a major Greek grocery chain provide corroborative evidence that is robust to a rich set of covariates, including increasingly demanding adjustments for job discretion. The findings contribute to a more complete understanding of why differences in well-being exist among employees performing intensive work, with implications for workers and employers.     

The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Is the institutionalization of urban movements inevitable? A comparison of the opportunities for sustained squatting in New York City and Amsterdam

In this article the opportunity structures of New York City and Amsterdam for organized squatting are compared. New York City knew two distinct squatting waves, with an intermission of several years. The literature on US urban movements predicts transformation through cooptation and repression. Only the first wave, in which housing activists used squatting as a tactic, fits this prediction. The second wave of squatting in New York City, and squatting in Amsterdam in general, escaped cooptation because they involved a squatters' movement proper, in which squatting was not only a tactic but also central to its existence. Compared to Amsterdam, squatting in New York was hampered by technical difficulties and political isolation. Stricter protection of private property made New York squatters restrict themselves to publicly‐owned abandoned buildings. Turf conflicts tended to develop on the neighbourhood level when these buildings were later claimed for the development of low‐income housing. In Amsterdam this type of conflict was rare because of the broad support for low‐income (re)development. Instead, Amsterdam saw citywide protest directed at the real estate sector and municipal authorities. Cet article compare la structure des opportunités des villes de New York et Amsterdam concernant les squats organisés. New York a connu deux vagues de squattage séparées de plusieurs années. Les textes sur les mouvements urbains aux Etats‐Unis prévoient une mutation par cooptation et répression. Seule la première vague, pour laquelle les militants en faveur du logement ont utilisé le squattage comme tactique, répond à cette prédiction. La seconde vague d'opérations à New York, et celles d'Amsterdam en général, ont échappéà la cooptation, car il s'agissait de mouvements de squatters à proprement parler, où le squat n'était pas seulement une tactique mais surtout un fondement de leur existence. Comparéà Amsterdam, le squattage à New York s'est heurtéà des problèmes techniques et à un isolement politique. La protection plus stricte de la propriété privée a forcé les squatters new‐yorkais à se limiter aux bâtiments publics abandonnés. Des luttes de territoires ont eu tendance à se développer entre voisins lorsque ces bâtiments ont ensuite été réclamés pour aménager des logements à faible loyer. A Amsterdam, rare fut ce genre de conflit grâce au vaste soutien favorable au (ré)aménagement social; au contraire, une protestation générale s'est élevée à l'encontre du secteur immobilier et des autorités municipales.     

Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation

We emphasize the role of accounting policies, and their audit, in an earnings management setting. We use a two–period agency in which three frictions interact: the agent privately observes action (or effort) supply and output, and the initial contract is subject to renegotiation. This creates a setting in which both players' behavior is of concern, and, importantly, information rationing is efficient. Moreover, this information rationing is directly interpretable as being produced by an accounting policy whose application is ensured by an auditor.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

On optimal investiment strategies

Suppose an investor has a fixed decision horizon and an appropriate utility function for measuring his or her utility of wealth. If there are only two investment vehicles, a risky and a risk-free asset, then the optimal investment strategy is such that, at any time, the amount invested in the risky asset must be the product of his or her “current risk tolerance” and the risk premium on the risky asset, divided by the square of the diffusion coefficient of the risky asset. In the case of more than one risky asset, the optimal investment strategy is similar, with the ratios of the amounts invested in the different risky assets being constant over time.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001